The only answer that would give Delamirie superior rights to Armory would be some type of agency, employer/employee rationale that Armory is finding if for Delamirie. All of the others would help the landowner of the location upon which the jewel was found -- but we know that was not Delamirie's place.
Armory found the jewel "on" the ground
Armory was working for Delamirie when the jewel was found
The jewel was "mislaid," not "lost."
Armory found the jewel "attached to or under" the ground
All of these are relevant except the good faith and honesty of the landowner. We did not see a case in which such good faith, particularly by the landowner, was relevant to the determination of de facto possession.
The honesty and good faith exhibited by the landowner.
The lost versus mislaid nature of the found property.
The amount of custody and control the landowner exercised over the location at which the property was found.
Whether the property was attached to or under the land upon which it was found.
Only the watch in the pile of leaves has a chance of going to the finder. Most likely, the watch was not placed in the pile (thus, not mislaid) nor does the landowner exercise much control over a pile of leaves in their front yard (custody and control) or the watch is attached to or under the property if in the pile.
A watch found, by a finder, in a pile of leaves in the front yard of the landowner's property.
A watch found, by a finder, in the kitchen on the landowner's property.
A watch found, by a finder, buried in the backyard of the landowner's property.
A watch found, by a finder, in a mailbox on the landowner's property.
The best answer, particularly for the reasoning used in McAvoy v. Medinia, is to make the property "lost" not "mislaid" -- and putting the pocketbook on the ground would help move the facts in that direction.
The barber kept the pocket-book's existence a secret, despite his promise to advertise its discovery.
The pocket-book was found by a shoplifter rather than a customer.
The finder was an employee of the barber shop owner when the pocket-book was found.
The pocket-book was found on the floor under the chair where the barber cuts customer's hair.
This is the best out of a bunch of bad answers -- this state of mind would defeat an adverse possession claim in a jurisdiction that requires aggressive adverse possession (an aggressive trespasser) (such as Maine). None of the others would help in any jurisdiction.
Geoff's possession was not "open and notorious" because Betsy had no idea that Geoff allowed his sheep to graze on her land.
Geoff's possession was not "continuous" because he did not allow the sheep to graze in the winter when the land was covered with snow.
Geoff's possession was not "hostile" because Geoff believed the land was part of his sheep farm.
Geoff's possession was not "exclusive" because other local sheep herders could also have grazed their sheep on the land.
The only answer that could work in at least some jurisdictions is that this is a minor encroachment, and thus for open and notorious, we need actual knowledge. All of the rest of the answers would not work any jurisdiction.
Andy's possession was not "continuous" because he usually parked his car on the street, rarely using the driveway extension.
Andy's possession was not "actual" because his car never drove over the fifteen inch strip of land.
Andy's possession was not "open and notorious" because Bobbie did not know where the fifteen inch encroachment was located.
Andy's possession was not "exclusive" because Bobbie could have still used the fifteen inch strip herself.
The "actual use" required under adverse possession is engaging in a use that a "true owner" (someone who actually owned the property) would most likely engage in.
Paying property taxes on the land.
Engaging in some sort of activity on the land.
Increasing the property value of the land.
Using the property as a "true owner" would likely use the land.
The time period to acquire title by adverse possession in this jurisdiction is a minimum of 21 years. Theneighbor has not been in continuous adverse possession for the entire 21-year period required because theneighbor spent one year in Europe after the first five years of possession. The dates in which she was a minority or mentally incompetent are either before or after adverse possession was perfected (if continuity had not been interrupted).
The daughter was age 17 when the neighbor first took possession of the land.
The neighbor never built a residence on the land.
Because the daughter is mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations has been suspended.
The neighbor was not in continuous possession of the land for 21 years.
Wilma's interest is a future interest that follows an expirable estate and does not gap or shift, so it is a remainder. It does have a limitation, but that has been met -- so she has a vested remainder. The present possessory interest is a fee simple absolute, especially since magic words are used.
Wilma has a vested remainder in fee simple absolute.
Wilma has a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute.
Wilma has a fee simple absolute.
Wilma has an executive interest in fee simple absolute.
The will creates a springing interest in the grandchildren (the first to reach 21) and thus Oscar needs a reversion to fill the gap and the future interest must be an executory interest since two of the remainder rules are broken (not following an expirable estate and springing). Once it becomes possessory, it will be a fee simple absolute given that is the default estate and there are no rules to the contrary.
Oscar has a possibility of reverter and Oscar's first grandchild to reach 21 has an contingent remainder in fee simple absolute.
Oscar has a possibility of reverter and Oscar's first grandchild to reach 21 has an executory interest in fee simple absolute.
Oscar has a reversion and Oscar's first grandchild to reach 21 has an contingent remainder in fee simple absolute.
Oscar has a reversion and Oscar's first grandchild to reach 21 has an executory interest in fee simple absolute.
Anitra's interest is a life estate -- the present possessory interest. Anitra is not dead, so she has no heirs.
Anitra has a life estate.
Anitra has a vested remained in a life estate.
Anitra has a contingent remainder in a life estate
Anitra has an executory interest in a life estate.
The economic waste on the property (not getting the money for the football stadium) is due to Betsy's current inaction -- not willing to sell her interest in the property. This would be permissive waste.
Betsy is committing permissive waste
Betsy is committing voluntary waste.
Betsy is committing ameliorative waste.
Betsy is committing perfunctory waste.
This question forces you to apply the unity of possession -- the only unity for a tenancy in common -- to a leasehold situation. Just like the man has the ability to possess the whole property, so does his tenant. But, the sister and cousin could also possess it. Put another way, the tenant steps into the man's shoes -- so enjoys the unity of possession, but most also observe it.
The lease is valid, but the tenant is evicted because one-third of the lease term has expired and the man had only a one-third interest to transfer.
The lease is valid, and the tenant is not evicted but must share possession with the sister and the cousin.
The lease is void, and the tenant is evicted.
The lease is valid, and the tenant retains exclusive occupancy rights for the balance of the term.
This is an application of the conceptions in Harms v. Sprague. Here, the jurisdiction treats the judgment like a lien. And the lien attaches to the son's 1/2 interest in the joint tenancy that disappears upon his death.
Yes, because a joint tenancy cannot be created using a will, and the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the farm as a tenant in common.
Yes, because the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the farm as a joint tenant with the daughter.
No, because the daughter became sole owner of the farm free and clear of the creditor's judgment lien when the son died.
No, because the son's interest was severed from the daughter's interest upon the filing of the lien.
Ben's transfer to Daniel severed the joint tenancy between Ben and Alice and Chris. At that stage, Alice and Chris are still joint tenants, but Daniel is a tenant in common with both Alice and Chris. At Chris's death, his interest disappears (due to the joint tenancy with Alice) and Alice's interest expands to fill the void. Then Alice, with 2/3, is a tenant in common with Daniel.
Alice, Daniel, and Ellen each have a one-third interest in Boons Farm as tenants in common.
Alice has a two-thirds interest and Daniel has a one-third interest in Boons Farm as tenants in common.
Alice has a two-thirds interest and Daniel has a one-third interest in Boons Farm as joint tenants.
Alice, Daniel, and Ellen each have a one-third interest in Boons Farm as joint tenants.
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