No, because the decorated tree did not cause an “injury in fact.” INCORRECT. Suffering from what we might describe as aesthetic harm is sufficient to give rise to an injury in fact. One might describe this type of harm as a “generalized grievance,” but at least in the Article III sense, a court is unlikely to view the harm as lacking concreteness and particularity in this case because the Plaintiff lives right across from the display, so she’s going to see the display all the time. If, on the other hand, the Plaintiff lived on the other side of town and only saw the display once, then we’d be getting closer to having a particularity problem. And if the Plaintiff simply read about the display in the newspaper, then concreteness and particularity would be a huge problem. (Note: generalized grievances also have somewhat different treatment under weird doctrinal rules that apply in Establishment Clause suits, as mentioned in the notes to the reading from Feb. 1, but I don’t suggest spending much time on those.)
No, because the town did not cause the injury. INCORRECT. So long as the town is maintaining the display, that is enough for purposes of standing. The town, after all, has full control over what is displayed in its parks, even if it delegates decision‐ making authority to private citizens from time to time. This isn’t like the Allen v. Wright case (a case mentioned in the notes of the standing reading) where the plaintiffs were being harmed by the independent decisions of a private school, and the government did not in any sense control those decisions.
No, because the court cannot order the Plaintiff’s requested relief. INCORRECT. Again, like in several of the earlier questions, a court could order this relief, even though—as a legal matter—it shouldn’t do it. In general, what a court can do—as a theoretical matter—is what guides standing analysis, whereas what a court should do is a merits issue.
No, because the town did not cause the injury.
No, because the court cannot order the Plaintiff’s requested relief.
No, because the decorated tree did not cause an “injury in fact.”
The validity of procedural rules is a "black box" that the court doesn't look inside of. The decision is assigned to another branch and the court is not going to interfere.
Against Pelosi, because the rule articulates an "intelligible principle."
In favor of Pelosi, because the rule gives the President a share of the legislative power.
Against Pelosi, because the validity of the House rule is a political question.
In favor of Pelosi, because the rule deprives members of Congress an opportunity to propose amendments to bills.
No, because Plaintiff hasn’t suffered an “injury in fact.” INCORRECT. It’s true that the Plaintiff hasn’t actually heard the song, so she can’t bring a claim on that basis. But we can reasonably infer that the Plaintiff’s business is being hurt by the Defendant’s actions, and that those actions are hurting the Plaintiff economically. So while this answer is not completely obvious, most courts would conclude that the business owner has standing to address any nuisances that negatively affect the business, and that the customer complaints are enough to show actual or likely harm to the business.
No, because the Plaintiff can’t assert the rights of other people. INCORRECT. Here, the Plaintiff isn’t asserting the rights of her customers. Rather, she’s asserting her own right not to have her business suffer from a nuisance. (see above)
No, because the court can’t order specific performance. INCORRECT. Again, this is a question of what the court should order, not what it can order. As mentioned before, “The question whether petitioners are entitled to the relief that they seek goes to the merits, not to standing.” Moreover, if a court ordered the relief, it would seem to fix the problem. (After all, who doesn’t like Journey songs?)
No, because the Plaintiff can’t assert the rights of other people.
No, because Plaintiff hasn’t suffered an “injury in fact.”
No, because the court can’t order specific performance.
This is not a particularized injury but generalized to the public at large (the threat of the bridge collapsing is more hypothetical). There is no concrete, actual, or imminent injury. There is no sovereign immunity because he/she is not suing the government itself, but the Secretary of Transportation (no qualified immunity because it's a suit for an injunction).
The issue was a delegation of legislative power.
The Sentencing Commission was exercising blended power
The Sentencing Commission was exercising legislative power
The Sentencing Commission was exercising executive power
The Sentencing Commission was exercising judicial power
No, because the Plaintiff’s chance of further injury is too speculative. CORRECT (sort of; see answer choice C). Here, the future injury is highly speculative. (Importantly, notice that the Plaintiff is only seeking an injunction regarding “further demonstrations”—i.e., possible demonstrations in the future that may end up not even happening!) If, on the other hand, the Plaintiff was seeking damages for the destruction of her store window, then an “injury in fact” would be obvious.
No, because the Plaintiff has failed to prove causation. CORRECT (sort of; see answer choice C). Here, there is a very attenuated relationship between the immigrant‐rights group’s acts—organizing a peaceful protest—and the independently organized counter‐protest, not to mention the decision (or maybe even accident?) of one of those counter‐protestors to destroy the store window. This is the type of situation where a court is very likely to find insufficient causation.
No, because A. and B. CORRECT! Both A and B are correct answers, so this is really the correct answer.
Yes. INCORRECT (see above).
No, because A. and B.
(A) No, because the Plaintiff’s chance of further injury is too speculative.
(B) No, because the Plaintiff has failed to prove causation.
The underlying basis for the statute is suspect, so there may be a problem with the substantive law, but there is no problem identified with regard to the procedures.
Yes, so long as a court concludes that the law does not actually advance the governmental interest in public safety.
No, because the fact pattern does not suggest that the driver has received insufficient process.
No, because the driver does not have a right to drive a taxi.
Yes, because procedural due process requires that the driver receive notice of the law's existence.
No, because the group does not have standing to assert the claims of its members. INCORRECT. An association has standing if (a) the association itself is directly injured (and can show causation and redressability) or (b) its members have standing and the purpose of the association is related to the type of injury at issue (e.g., the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) can sue in gun‐rights cases but not abortion‐rights cases, even if lots of NRA members are trying to get abortions).
No, because the President’s tweet does not give rise to an “injury in fact.” CORRECT. The President’s tweet is a great example of something that may suggest an eventual injury that might be coming down the pike, but the President hasn’t yet formally turned over Alaska to the Russian Federation, so this is the type of alleged injury that is too hypothetical to count as an “injury in fact” for purposes of Article III standing.
No, because the President has a First Amendment right to make threats and insult people. INCORRECT. It’s true that the President has First Amendment rights and that those rights help insulate him from liability for many of his tweets. But how these rights affect the legal analysis in this hypothetical is a merits issue, not a standing issue.
Yes, if the group can prove that giving Alaska back to Russia would cause economic harm to the people of Alaska. INCORRECT. It is necessary to show some type of harm (although merely an unwanted change in sovereignty would definitely be enough for standing purposes), but this isn’t sufficient for standing purposes. The harm also needs to be concrete—not highly speculative.
No, because the President’s tweet does not give rise to an “injury in fact.”
No, because the group does not have standing to assert the claims of its members.
Yes, if the group can prove that giving Alaska back to Russia would cause economic harm to the people of Alaska.
No, because the President has a First Amendment right to make threats and insult people.
The case is not moot - it's a claim for damages which can still be received after recovery. You can sue the agent of the government who caused your injury, and here we have a suit against the US. You can't sue the government itself unless the government has consented to suit.
The government wins because it is immune from suit unless it consents.
The Plaintiff wins because the rule that all drivers must stop at stop signs is "clearly established."
The Plaintiff wins because an agent of the government caused his injury.
The government wins because the case is now moot after the Plaintiff's full recovery.
Yes, because he applied for the earlier job, so his injury is “particular,” not “general.” INCORRECT. It’s true enough that the Plaintiff might end up suffering a particularized injury, but such an injury is highly speculative at this point (see D below).
Yes, because he is seeking an injunction, not damages. INCORRECT. Whether the plaintiff is seeking an injunction does not make any difference to the standing analysis in this situation.
No,because he is suing a state governmental entity. INCORRECT. The fact that the Plaintiff is suing a state governmental entity doesn’t matter here.
No, because any injury he might personally suffer is highly speculative and non‐ imminent at this point. CORRECT. We know that the Plaintiff applied for a job at VCU and that the job is currently held by a visa holder who might not have his visa renewed. But that visa non‐renewal is a long way away, and there are lots of things that are highly speculative about the plaintiff’s injury. For instance, will VCU still have the policy in two years when the immigrant’s visa expires? Will the federal government still have its policy? Will the Iraqi immigrant still be working at VCU at that point? Will the Plaintiff be in a position to get the job? A court would very likely tell the Plaintiff to at least wait until the person holding the job is actually overstaying his visa, thereby putting the Plaintiff in a position where he’s potentially being harmed by the policy. And even then, the Plaintiff might have trouble with standing because of the speculative nature of his injury—namely, who’s to say that the Plaintiff would get the job instead?
No, because any injury he might personally suffer is highly speculative and non‐ imminent at this point.
Yes, because he is seeking an injunction, not damages.
Yes, because he applied for the earlier job, so his injury is “particular,” not “general.”
No, because he is suing a state governmental entity
Yes, because she is suffering harm by having her speech “chilled” by the VCU gag order. CORRECT. Although the Plaintiff hasn’t actually spoken out, the gag order is nonetheless already causing her to suffer an Article III injury by chilling her speech. She can thus bring what’s known as a “pre‐enforcement challenge” against the policy, without having to wait for a potential personnel action. To be sure, it isn’t entirely clear whether she’d end up being fired. But this is an instance where the mere threat of termination itself causes injury (again: her speech is being effectively silenced), so there won’t be any problem demonstrating injury in fact. So this is kind of like the procedural rights cases, where the injury is the denial of the procedure, not the denial of the substantive result (e.g., whether you actually have a valid claim) which might still be quite speculative at the time that the government denies you some form of procedure.
Yes, because the employee’s termination will violate her First Amendment rights. INCORRECT. This is a merits issue, not a standing issue.
No, because the employee hasn’t even spoken yet, much less gotten fired, so there isn’t yet an “injury in fact.” INCORRECT (see above)
No, because the employee is choosing not to speak, so there isn’t sufficient causation. INCORRECT (see above). It’s true, I suppose, that she’s choosing not to speak. But remember that the “causation” portion of standing analysis is focused on intervening decisions or events that stand between the plaintiff and the defendant. Here, there isn’t any attenuation at all: VCU has set a policy that is directly impacting the Plaintiff’s ability to freely exercise her speech rights.
No,because the employee hasn’t even spoken yet, much less gotten fired,so there isn’t yet an “injury in fact.”
Yes, because she is suffering harm by having her speech “chilled” by the VCU gag order.
Yes, because the employee’s termination will violate her First Amendment rights.
No, because the employee is choosing not to speak, so there isn’t sufficient causation.
The court has jurisdiction in cases like this because a society that is organized around a particular type of activity can assert injuries of its members related to that purpose of the society membership.
The court has jurisdiction because the National Autobahn Society can assert the intangible injuries of its members.
The court has jurisdiction because the National Autobahn Society can assert its own injuries.
The court lacks jurisdiction because the National Autobahn Society does not have standing to assert the injuries of its members.
The court lacks jurisdiction because the suit involves a governmental contract.
Here we have a valid delegation of power to the executive branch pursuant to a statute that specifies regulatory authority. The only Constitutional restriction is the intelligible principle and we have one.
Yes, because the MSA, which went through bicameralism and presentment, gives the Secretary rule making power and includes an intelligible principle.
No, because the regulations did not go through bicameralism and presentment.
No, because the MSA does not articulate an intelligible principle.
Yes, because the case raises a political question.
We aren't dealing with a situation in which the Plaintiff is suing the government, he is suing FBI agents so the suit is against executive branch officials, not against the government itself. Justiciability is about whether the court can hear the case, not about the merits.
The suit is not justiciable unless the government has waived sovereign immunity.
The suit is not justiciable because it involves a political question.
The suit is justiciable because the Due Process Clause prevents the government from seizing evidence without a hearing.
The suit is justiciable because there are no "prudential" or Article III justiciability problems.
"Excessive or unreasonable" is not a legal standard. Intelligible principle is the standard for non-delegation cases. It's a constitutional law if Congress has announced an intelligible principle by which the executive is supposed to implement the law - in that case it is treated as effectively not being a delegation of power.
The delegation must be *congruent and proportional*
The delegation cannot be *excessive or unreasonable*
The delegation must be *necessary and proper*
Congress must announce an *intelligible principle*
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