What you are looking for is a situation where there is a mootness problem and there is not an exception to mootness.
A man seeks an injunction for the government to open the swimming pool in the spring. By the time the case is heard, it's already winter again.
A woman is worries that her boss will fire her. She files a suit seeking an injunction to prevent the firing. The boss never fires her.
A neighbor seeks an injunction to prevent a power plant from emitting smoke. The power plant later goes bankrupt and shuts down.
Jimmy often steals Johnny's lunch. When Jimmy steals Johnny's next lunch, Johnny files suit. Jimmy quickly returns the lunch.
Whether Georgia could sue a citizen of another state in federal court.
Whether Georgia could sue a citizen of another state in state court.
Whether a citizen of another state could sue Georgia in state court.
Whether a citizen of another state could sue Georgia in federal court.
This is a case about the diversity jurisdiction grant and whether it included an ability to sue a state. Sovereign immunity is a background principle that's implicit in the grant of jurisdiction.
The Jury Clause.
The jurisdictional provisions (like the diversity jurisdiction rules).
The Due Process Clause.
The "case or controversy" requirement.
Congress only passes laws, it doesn't seize assets but can authorize the President to seize private assets. Justice Black opinion doesn't turn on whether there has been a formal declaration of war or not.
Only Congress, not the president, may seize private assets.
The President may seize private assets, but only when war is formally declared.
The president may seize private assets, but only based on a valid law.
The United States
The extent of delegation is determined by non-delegation doctrine and that is something that judges can apply. It is a justiciable constitutional issue where the other ones are issues that are completely assigned by the Constitution to the Senate/President respectively.
Whether a Senate vote on a politically contentious issue complies with the Senate's own rules.
Whether -- for the purposes of non-delegation doctrine -- a law regulation political issues (e.g., elections) articulates an "intelligible principle."
Whether the political conditions in a foreign country justify a President's formal recognition of that country.
Truman did inform Congress about his action. His informing Congress didn't matter because the issue was whether or not he was legally authorized. (it mattered to Frankfurter and Jackson)
Truman's decision to inform didn't matter.
Truman's failure to inform didn't matter.
Truman's failure to inform undercut his case.
Truman's decision to inform allowed him to win.
It might end up being true that the Defendant didn’t cause Dog’s death, but that’s going to be a merits issue—not a question of standing. The cause of action (negligence) requires a showing of causation, too, so the merits and standing analysis will almost certainly merge. Also, as I’ll reiterate throughout my comments here, the “causation” prong focuses on the degree of attenuation between the Plaintiff’s injury and the Defendant’s conduct, so what you should be looking out for is situations where there were intervening actors or events that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. If so, causation might be a big issue. For instance, if Defendant gave Plaintiff an orchid, Plaintiff’s wife was allergic to orchids and sneezed in Dog’s face, and then Dog (somehow) got the flu and died, then maybe there would be an Article III standing problem. Here, however, the Plaintiff doesn’t have an attenuated theory of injury; rather, he says that the Defendant inadequately cared for Dog. The Court can’t possibly bring Dog back to life. A lawyer obviously would never file this complaint. But the point here is that the plaintiff must be seeking relief that is physically possible.
(B) No, because the Court cannot “redress” Dog’s death in the way requested.
(A) No, because the Defendant did not “cause” Dog’s death.
The plaintiff will have standing to seek damages—that’s something that the court can order—but the claim for injunctive relief is evaluated separately.
Yes as to both claims.
No, because the Defendant did not “cause” Dog’s death.
Yes as to the damages claim, but no as to the claim for injunctive relief.
Congress had already legislated on the issue of labor disputes and rejected this type of seizure.
Congress was actively considering legislation on the issue of labor-related seizures.
Congress had not even considered legislation on the issue of labor-related seizures.
We are looking for the situations where other branches have made some sort of constitutional rule. Context looks to the founding itself: what the constitution meant at the founding. Precedent is about judicial interpretations. Policy is about the practical consequences.
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because he has not suffered an “injury in fact.” INCORRECT. The Plaintiff alleges that he has paid too much tax, and that the Government should give him money back, so he has suffered a concrete injury. Whether it’s self‐imposed or not, the overpayment of taxes is definitely an injury.
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because federal law does not allow him to file an amended tax return more than a year after the original return filing, and therefore the Court cannot “redress” his injury. INCORRECT. This is trickier, but notice that the court could (in the abstract) offer relief to the Plaintiff—that is, the court could (as a logistical matter) hear the suit and order the government to give the money back to the Plaintiff. This issue is distinct from whether the court should (as a legal matter) hear the case (here, it obviously shouldn’t). As the Supreme Court has said, “The question whether petitioners are entitled to the relief that they seek goes to the merits, not to standing.”
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because he caused his own injury. INCORRECT. Again, this is pretty tricky, but this answer choice is wrong. For Article III causation analysis, remember to focus on whether there’s some intervening third party (or other attenuated chain of events) that extends the chain of causation. So just in terms of gut‐level instinct, this fact pattern isn’t one that should be setting off your causation alarm bells. Also, although I didn’t quite spell things out explicitly in the fact pattern, just think through what is causing the Plaintiff’s ongoing injury: It’s the Government’s decision to keep the Plaintiff’s money! So there’s both a very tight nexus between the two parties and the Government’s current refusal to act is causing the alleged harm. Lastly, another way that you might know that there isn’t an Article III causation issue: If there wasn’t sufficient causation for the February 2017 suit, there wouldn’t even be standing for a suit filed in March 2015; and surely that can’t be true, right?
Yes, the Plaintiff has standing because he suffered an “injury in fact,” there is “causation,” and there is “redressability.”
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because federal law does not allow him to file an amended tax return more than a year after the original return filing, and therefore the Court cannot “redress” his injury.
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because he has not suffered an “injury in fact.”
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because he caused his own injury.
This looks like Youngstown but unlike in Youngstown we have a specific denial of the President compelling any acts.
The case raises a political question.
The President acted unlawfully, because the statute bars compelled acts.
The President acted lawfully, because order is only temporary.
The employees lack standing.
No,the Plaintiff lacks standing because he caused his own injury.
No, the Plaintiff lacks standing because federal law does not allow the judge to order any relief in this case.
This case looks just like Chadha, Congress cannot give itself authority in the execution of law.
No, because Congress has given itself a role in the execution of the law.
No, because the law lacks an intelligible principle.
Yes, because Congress may limit executive power unless the Constitution grants sole authority to the Executive Branch.
Yes, because the Congress, pursuant to the Naturalization Clause, may decide who may be lawfully admitted to or deported from the United States.
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